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Using a simple dynamic consumption-based asset pricing model, this
paper explores the implications of a representative investor with smooth
ambiguity averse preferences [Klibano⁄, Marinacci and Mukerji, Econo-
metrica (2005)] and provides a comparative analysis of risk aversion and
ambiguity aversion. The perception of ambiguity is described by a hidden
Markovian consumption growth process. The hidden states di⁄er both for
the mean and the volatility. We show that the ambiguity-averse investor
downweights high-mean states in favor of low-mean ones. However, such
distortion appears much stronger in low-volatility regimes: high volatility
attenuates the distortion due to ambiguity concerns. It follows that (i) am-
biguity aversion always implies higher equity premia but sustained levels of
ambiguity aversion do not help explaining the high volatility of the equity
premium observed in the data (volatility puzzle); (ii) our calibrated model
can match the moments of the equity premium and risk free rate and can
generate asset-price stylized facts like a procyclical price-dividend ratio
and countercyclical conditional equity premia; however, (iii) high levels
of ambiguity aversion, necessary to explain high equity returns, produce
counterfactual price-dividend ratio time series across volatility states.
Keywords: Ambiguity aversion, volatility, asset pricing puzzles, ro-
bustness.
JEL: D81, E44, G12
1 Introduction
In this paper we examine a standard dynamics asset pricing model in which
the endowment law of motion is modelled as a hidden regime switching process
and the representative agent learns the probabilities of each state via Bayes
rule. We depart from rational expectations assuming that the investor feels
ambiguous about the probabilities of the realization of each state, which di⁄er
both for the mean and the volatility values. Her preferences are represented
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1by a generalized recursive smooth ambiguity model proposed in Klibano⁄ et al.
(2005, 2008), which nests the standard Epstein and Zin preferences framework
and the maxmin expected utility framework of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)
as two special cases, respectively with no and maximal ambiguity aversion.
Smooth ambiguity aversion is manifested through a pessimistic distortion of the
pricing kernel in the sense that the agent attaches more weight to the states
with lower continuation values. In this respect, this approach is more ￿ exible
than the maxmin approach according to which the decision maker conditions
her decisions exclusively on the worst case model. The pessimistic distortion
implied by the ambiguity-averse preferences suggests that such formalization can
potentially contribute to the resolution of the equity premium puzzle (Mehra
and Prescott, 1985). Knight (1921) has been the ￿rst to distinguish among risk
and uncertainty. In this sense, the theory of subjective probabilities nulli￿es
this distinction by reducing all uncertainty to risk through the use of beliefs
expressible as probabilities. In our case, ambiguity aversion on the plausible
probability distributions posterior implies that the posterior of the hidden state
and the conditional distribution of the consumption process cannot be reduced
to a compound predictive distribution, unlike the standard Bayesian framework.
The experimental motivation of such preferences modeling is provided by the
well known Ellsberg paradox (Ellsberg, 1961), showing that decision makers
prefer the risky urn to the ambiguous urn, in a way that violates the expected
utility framework.
The goal of our work is understanding and assessing the extents to which
ambiguity averse preferences can help explaining the main asset pricing puz-
zles: the risk free rate puzzle (Weil, 1989), the volatility puzzle (Shiller, 1981)
together with the equity premium puzzle. Furthermore, we also assess the ca-
pacity of the ambiguity-averse preferences to imply procyclical price-dividend
ratios and countercyclical conditional expected equity premia documented in
the literature (e.g. Campbell and Shiller, 1988). Finally, we compare the time
series of the price-dividend ratios and the equity premia implied by the model
with the observed one. Our attention is focused on the ability of the model
to capture the striking increase in prices observed during the great moderation
period. Figure 1 and ￿gure 2 depict, respectively, the post-war time series of the
consumption growth rate and the CRSP Value-Weighted price-dividend ratios.
They suggest a quite evident negative correlation between consumption volatil-
ity and the price-dividend ratios, documented also in Lettau et al. (2008) and
Bansal and Yaron (2004). We do not ask ourselves the causes of the decline of
volatility, rather we want to investigate its e⁄ects on prices and the role of am-
biguity aversion in this respect. In order to capture the switching in volatility,
we model the consumption growth rate as a hidden Markov switching process
with two hidden Markov chains, each of them determining, respectively, the
switching between mean regimes and volatility regimes.
We show that the ambiguity-averse investor downweights high-mean states
in favour of low-mean ones. However, such distortion appears much stronger
in low-volatility regimes. Between two high-mean states, the ambiguity-averse
investor removes more mass probability from the best state (high mean and
2low volatility) rather than from the high-mean and high-volatility case. Simi-
larly, between two low mean states, the distortion downweights more the highly
volatile states￿probabilities rather than the stable states￿probabilities. The
intuition is the following: when the investor perceives a high-mean observation,
the worst case is to think that the quality of the observation is quite bad. Con-
versely, after a low-mean observation, the ambiguity averse investor will add
mass probability to the low-volatility case since a good quality new is the worst
case 1. In other words, ambiguity aversion has a ￿rst order e⁄ect among mean
states. The distortion among volatility states is a second order e⁄ect. It fol-
lows that (i) ambiguity aversion always implies higher equity premia but (ii) the
slighter distortion which results in high volatility times implies a moderation
in the price volatility and, overall, an uncertain e⁄ect of ambiguity aversion on
volatility of returns and prices occurs; (iii) our calibrated model can match the
moments of the equity premium and risk free rate and can generate asset-price
stylized facts like a procyclical price-dividend ratio and countercyclical condi-
tional equity premia; however, (iv) high levels of ambiguity aversion, necessary
to explain high equity returns, produce counterfactual price-dividend ratio time
series across volatility states.
Ambiguity concerns have recently received a huge popularity in the macro-
economic and ￿nance literature. Contributions have been mainly focused on
the maxmin expected utility (or multiple priors) model of Gilboa and Schmei-
dler (1989) and the robustness theory developed by Hansen and Sargent (2001,
2008). In the maxmin framework, there exist several papers which consider the
e⁄ect of ambiguity concerns in asset pricing. Epstein and Schneider (2008) an-
alyze the e⁄ects of ambiguous quality of intangible informarion on asset prices,
Leippold et al. (2008) analyze a learning model under ambiguity in a continuous
time framework. This literature is also related to contributions which impose
pessimism and beliefs￿distortion in a very speci￿c ways without a formalized
decision theoretic foundation (Cecchetti et al. 2000, Abel et al., 2002, and
Brandt et al., 2004 among others). Our work is closely related to Ju and Miao
(2007) who also considers a smooth ambiguity averse investor. However, their
work is based on Cecchetti et al. (2000) data set, which ends on 1993, when
the decline of consumption volatility was not appreciable yet: the authors do
not impose any switching among volatility states and consequently, do not
investigate the ability of such preferences to reproduce the negative observed
correlaton between consumption volatility and prices.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical frame-
work of the smooth ambiguity averse preferences. Section 3 presents the model
and the theoretical asset pricing implications. Section 4 provides a comparative
analysis of the e⁄ects of degree of ambiguity aversion, while Section 5 describes
the quantitative implications of the model, both in terms of the analysis of the
moments and the time series implications. Section 6 concludes.
1The intuition is similar to Epstein and Schneider (2008) who consider a di⁄erent framework
where ambiguity is imposed on the quality of the intangible information.
32 Smooth Ambiguity Preferences
Recursive preferences have become a standard tool for studying economic behav-
iour in dynamic stochastic environments and for parameterizing risk aversion
and intertemporal substitution. We assume that time is discrete, with dates
t = 0;1;2;:::At each time t > 0, let fIt : t ￿ 0g denote the sequence of con-
ditioning information sets available to an investor at date t: Adapted to this
sequence are consumption processes fCt : t ￿ 0g and a corresponding sequence
of continuation values fVt : t ￿ 0g associated with this consumption process.
The date t components Ct and Vt are restricted to be in the date t conditioning
information set. The continuation values are determined recursively and used
to rank alternative consumption processes.
As a starting point, we use Epstein and Zin (1989) recursive preferences,
which separate between risk aversion and the elasticity of intertemporal substi-
tution such that consumers are not indi⁄erent to the timing of the resolution
of uncertainty. We use the following constant elasticity of substitution - CES
recursion:
Vt = H (Ct;[Rt (Vt+1)]) =
h
(1 ￿ ￿)(Ct)





where H is a time aggregator and Rt is a certainty equivalent function. The
time aggregator is all that matters in deterministic settings. The rate of time
preferences, ￿ 2 (0;1) is assumed to be built in and constant and 1
￿ determines
the intertemporal elasticity of subtitution (IES) for deterministic consumption
paths. Following Epstein and Zin, many recent applications, particularly in dy-
namic asset pricing models, use the homothetic version of the utility function
which combines the constant elasticity time aggregator in (1) with a linear ho-








where ￿ is the constant Arrow Pratt coe¢ cent for relative risk aversion. When
Vt is convex (concave) in its second argument, that is when ￿ > ￿ (￿ < ￿), the
consumer exibits preference for early (late) resolution of uncertainty.
Considering smooth ambiguity preferences implies considering an additional
operator, which will de￿ne the certainty equivalent for future utilities taking
into account ambiguity concerns. As in Hansen and Sargent (2006, 2007), we
impose ambiguity over the transition probabilities of the hidden states. The
authors propose a log exponential speci￿cation, which, in the simple case of two
possible hidden states, takes the form:

















f[Rj￿ = 1 +   (logb ￿ ￿ log￿)]b ￿+
[Rj￿ = 2 +   (log(1 ￿ b ￿) ￿ log(1 ￿ ￿))](1 ￿ b ￿)g
;
where ￿ is an indicator variable for the hidden state, ￿ represent the full Bayesian
beliefs (or ambiguity neutral probabilities), the parameter   is inversely related
to the degree of probabilities misspeci￿cation aversion, so that when   ! 1,
T hs (V ) = V: This operator produces twisted model probabilities, b ￿: it shifts
probabilities towards the model that has the worse value at time t: Following
Klibano⁄ (2005), we use an alternative speci￿cation. We start the description
of smooth ambiguity model by presenting the static setting of a utility function


















A ￿ E￿￿E￿u(C);8C : S ! R+;
where u is a von Neumann-Morgestern (vN-M) utility function, ￿ is a func-
tion which captures ambiguity attitudes, ￿ is a subjective prior over the set
￿ of probability measures on S that the decision maker think possible. There
may be subjective uncertainty about what the right probability on S is: ￿ is
the decision maker￿ s subjective prior over ￿ , the set of possible probabilities
￿ over S, and therefore measures the subjective relevance of a particular ￿ as
the right probability. Letting ￿ = ￿￿u￿1; we see that while u characterizes risk
aversion, ambiguity aversion is captured by ￿: a concave ￿ characterizes ambi-
guity aversion. Notice that, unless ￿ is a linear function (ambiguity neutrality),
there is in general no reduction between ￿ and ￿: The perception of ambiguity
is characterized by the subjective set of measures ￿ while ambiguity aversion is
completely described by the properties of the function ￿.2
In our model, we consider the dynamic version of the smooth ambiguity pref-





; ￿ > 0; 6= 1; (4)
where ￿ is the ambiguity aversion parameter. Therefore, we consider the fol-
lowing recursion:
Vt = H (C;T (R(Vt+1)));
where the ambiguity operator, in the simple case of two states, takes the form:
2See Klibano⁄ et al. (2005) for a detailed discussion of the separation between ambiguity






(R j ￿ = 1)
1￿￿
1 ￿ ￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)






which can be compared to (3). Considering N generic hidden states and apply-



































It is easy to see that if ￿ = ￿; (6) reduces to (1) and the investor is ambiguity
neutral. When ￿ > ￿ the investor displays ambiguity aversion and no reduction
is possible between the state beliefs and the conditional expectations:
3 The Model
3.1 Endowment
We consider a simple Lucas (1978) endowment economy. In order to capture
the e⁄ect of the switching of volatility regimes, as in Lettau et al. (2008), we









+ ￿ (vt+1)"t+1; (7)
where the variables ￿t+1 and vt+1 are two independent two-state Markov chains
with possible values 1 and 2. We suppose that ￿(1) = ￿h > ￿(2) = ￿l and
￿ (1) = ￿h > ￿ (2) = ￿l: The driving process "t+1 is a simple i.i.d. standard
normal. The transition probability matrices of the Markov Chains, P￿ and P￿



























ii represents the probability of remaining in the mean-state i and p￿
ii
the probability of remaining on the volatility-state i. Therefore, we consider
a 4 states economy, whose transition matrix can be computed by taking the
Kronecker product between the transition matrices, (8) and (9):
P = P￿ ￿ P￿;
6where ￿ denotes the Kronecker product operator. Consequently, we consider a
Markov chain, Zt; which switches among four states. State 1 is represented by
high growth and high volatility [￿ = ￿h;￿ = ￿h]; state 2 is represented by low
growth and high volatility [￿ = ￿l;￿ = ￿h]; state 3 denotes the state with high
growth and low volatility [￿ = ￿h;￿ = ￿l] and state 4 is the low-growth and
low-volatility case [￿ = ￿l;￿ = ￿l].
3.2 Learning
Let de￿ne the conditional probabilities of a state j with ￿j;t = Pr(Zt+1 = jjIt)
and the vestor of the conditional probabilities ￿t = [￿t (1);:::;￿t (4)]
0 : Agents
update their posterior beliefs after each observation via Bayes￿rule:
￿t+1 = P
(￿t ￿ ft)
10 (￿t ￿ ft)
￿ B (￿ct+1;￿t); (10)









sity function of the normal distribution with mean ￿j and ￿j, and the operator
￿ represents element by element multiplication.
3.3 Asset pricing Implications
As it is standard in consumption based asset pricing models, the representative
investor chooses to invest a fraction xk of his disposable wealth Wt ￿ Ct on a
risky asset k. The agent￿ s budget constraint is given by
Wt+1 = (Wt ￿ Ct)(Rw;t+1); (11)
where Rw;t+1 is the gross return on the wealth portfolio between period t and
t + 1, which is also the return on the consumption claim. If we suppose that





k=1 xkt = 1: We solve the investor￿ s problem by
dynamic programming methods. The state variables of our problem are the
level of wealth and beliefs (Wt;￿t). We guess the following functional form of
the value function:
Vt (Wt;￿t) = WtG(￿t); (12)
and we write the Bellman equation that we substitute in (6):




























The optimization is subject to the following constraints:
7Wt+1 = (Wt ￿ Ct)Rw;t+1;








where Rf;t+1 is the gross return on riskless asset between period t and t + 1.
Substituting the ￿rst line of the budget constraint we get






























Proposition 1 The ￿rst order condition with the respect to consumption plan



























Proof. See Appendix A.1
Equation (15) can be manipulated in order to emphasize the e⁄ects of am-
biguous beliefs in the equilibrium determination. Suppose for the moment that
our investor is ambiguity neutral. Then the equilibrium condition corresponding
































Let us go back to eq. (15) and let us multiply and divide the expression inside








































































































































































is the distorted belief
used by the investor who fears ambiguity over the transition probabilities. Eq.
(17), compared to eq. (16) shows how the ambiguous investor behaves as an
ambiguity neutral investor with distorted beliefs3.
The ￿rst order condition with the respect to the trading startegy, xk, permits
us to characterize the pricing kernel for our model.





























Proof. See Appendix A.2
The pricing kernel is also a hidden stochastic variable. Eq. (18) shows that
when ￿ = ￿; we get the usual pricing kernel for time-non separable preferences
without ambiguity concerns, and when we further impose time separability,






functions. This equation reveals that optimal portfolio rules are a⁄ected by







3Note, however, that the expected returns, being de￿ned via the price-consumption and
price-dividend ratios, depend on the degree of ambiguity aversion, in the general case in which
utility functions are not logarithmic.
9Let PD
t denote the ex-dividend price of a claim to the dividend stream measured
at the end of time t, and PC
t denote the ex-dividend price of a share of a claim




and the price-consumption ratio
PC
t = ’C (￿t)Ct
where ’(￿) and ’C (￿t) have to be determined. In equilibrium, we have that on












As in Campbell(1986) and Abel(1999) the dividend on equity, Dt; is modelled
as consumption raised to a power ￿ : 4
Dt = C￿
t ;
this speci￿cation implies that the volatility of dividends is proportional to the
volatility of consumption and it is a convenient representation because, while
keeping the number state variables limited, allows for higher volatility of the





























The equilibrium condition (20) is a functional equation from which we can
derive the price-consumption ratio ’C (￿): Further, substituting (33) into (32),
we derive the equilibrium condition for the price-dividend ratio function.













We solve these functional equations numerically on a grid of values for the
state variables ￿t:5
4Abel (1999) shows that this speci￿cation is a good approximation to represent leverage
equity.
5In the Appendix we describe the functional equations in more details. The Matlab codes
and numerical agorithms are available under request.
104 Comparative Analysis
In this section we present a comparative analysis on the behaviour of prices
and the equity premium. These types of studies are not new. Veronesi (1999),
Cechetti et al. (2000) or Ju and Miao (2007) study equilibrium prices when the
endowment is characterized by a hidden growth rate of the consumption process.
Prices are analyzed as a function of the high mean state. These studies typically
￿nd that the equilibrium prices of the asset are an increasing and convex function
of the high mean state belief. The intuition is quite straighforward and has been
￿rst proposed in Veronesi (1999). Suppose we believe we are in the low growth
state. When a positive new arrives, the probability of being in a high growth
state increases. This causes the investor to expect higher return in the future, to
buy more assets increasing, therefore, the price. At the same time, however, the
closer is the probability of being in a high growth state to 0.5, the higher the
uncertainty of the investitor about which state is realizing. This uncertainty
may cause the investor to wait in order to get more information. The price-
dividend ratio timidly increases, suggesting that the former e⁄ect dominates
the latter. Let us consider the other way around. We believe we are in the
high growth state and a bad new occurs. Again the e⁄ect is twofold. On
one side, investors are incentivated to sell the asset, on the other, again, the
uncertainty increases, because our belief is now closer to 0.5. Therefore both
e⁄ects lower the equilibrium prices and the decrease is more accentuated. This
fact causes the price-dividend ratio to be a convex function. Similar ￿ndings
have been documented by Ju and Miao (2007) who include also ambiguity with
the respect the transition probabilities between high and low growth states.
They show that ambiguity does not signi￿cantly modify the characteristics of
the price dividend ratio, except that it accentuates the curvature, helping to
explain the high volatility of asse prices. Also Lettau et al. (2008) document
an increasing and convex price dividend ratio.
Figure (3) represents an example of such comparative study. It proposes the
log price dividend ratio as function of the beliefs of being in a low volatility state
(upper panels) and as a function of the high-mean state belief (lower panels).
Horizontally, we di⁄erentiate the conditional cases considered (respectively, high
and low mean and low and high volatility). The solid line corresponds to the
ambiguity neutrality case (￿ = ￿ = 25), the dashed and dotted line represents
positive levels of ambiguity aversion, respectively ￿ ￿ ￿ = 5 and ￿ ￿ ￿ = 10:
We start our discussion focusing on the lower panels, so to be able to make a
comparison with existing studies. In all cases considered the price dividend func-
tion is increasing and convex. It follows that the model predicts a pro-cyclical
price-dividend function, consistently with the empirical observations. Second,
we observe that higher levels of ambiguity aversion always imply lower prices
since our investor requires higher premium to hold risky and ambiguous asset.
Further, comparing the two panels horizontally, the e⁄ect of ambiguity aversion
appears much stronger in low-volatility regimes: high volatility attenuates the
distortion due to ambiguity concerns. In high-volatility states, it becomes more
di¢ cult to distinguish high-growth and low-growth regimes from dividend obser-
11vations. That is, in high-volatility regimes the investor perceives the increased
risk, but his perception of ambiguity is reduced because the worst-case model is
not too "far", given some de￿ned norms to measure closeness between data gen-
erating processes. The panels above also reveals interesting features. As could
be expected, a convex and increasing price dividend ratio is also obtained when
plotting against the low-volatility state beliefs. However, the curvature is ￿ at-
ter for higher levels of ambiguity aversion, which, while implying always lower
prices, has a stronger e⁄ect when the investor believes that the low-valuation
state is very likely. This further implies that the volatility of prices is also re-
duced, as if the ambiguity-averse investor, being an insuring agent, reacts less
to news. In this respect, ambiguity aversion is providing a rationale for price
underreaction to news about fundamentals. Indeed, as we move from the belief
of the high volatility state to the low-volatility state, the ambiguity averse in-
vestor will continue requiring a compensation for holding the ambiguous asset,
while risk aversion will play an attenuated role. This is because our investor is
pessimistic and the e⁄ects of such distortion of beliefs appear much more accen-
tuated in low-volatility states where the low-mean state is perceived worse than
the low-valuation state with high volatility. The stronger e⁄ect of ambiguity
aversion in low-volatility cases causes the price-dividend ratio to be much ￿ at-
ter suggesting that high leveles of ambiguity aversion will not help explaining the
high volatility of equity premium observed in the data (volatility puzzle).Our
result is in contrast with Ju and Miao (2007) who claim that, in a world where
the switching is only allowed among mean states, ambiguity aversion always
increases the volatility of equity returns. The authors focus on the early post-
war sample (until 1993) which does not allow to appreciate a sensible switching
among volatility regimes.
Figure(4) also compares the dynamics of the expected equity premium for
di⁄erent level of ambiguity. Again, not surprisingly, the equity premium is
always higher for higher levels of ambiguity aversion. When the uncertainty
about the state is higher, also the ambiguity premium is higher. This is be-
cause ambiguity-averse prefences imply a distortion of beliefs towards the lower
continuation state injecting pessimism in the economy.
Figure (5) shows that, for given level of ambiguity aversion, uncertainty
about volatility state also requires higher expected equity premium. However,
increasing ambiguity aversion implies lower levels of equity premium, as if the
ambiguity averse investor, not being able to di⁄erentiate among worst and best
model, perceives less ambiguity. Even if the level of volatility is ambiguous,
the ambiguity averse investor is not requiring a compensation for not knowing
in which volatile state is the economy. This aspect of the model implies that
switching among volatility states does not necessarily imply important e⁄ects
on prices when the investor is ambiguity averse.
125 Quantitative Analysis
In this section we present the quantitative analysis. Since the state beliefs are
the only state variables of the model, we proceed estimating the ￿ltered state
probabilities so to obtain the implied time series of the economic variables of in-
terest, prices and equity premia. Our goal is not only engaging in matching the
moments, as it is usually done in asset pricing studies, but we want also to com-
pare the implied time series with real data and, in particular, we want to assess
the ability of the model to replicate long and medium frequency ￿ uctuations in
prices.
Studies who typically focus on the moments are aimed at explaining ￿nancial
markets￿puzzles like the high equity returns together with very low risk free
rates. The observed values are typically very hard to replicate via simple con-
sumption based asset pricing models. Further, from Shiller (1981) the literature
has also documented very high volatility of the equity returns (see also Camp-
bell, 1999 for a survey). Table (1) reproduces sample moments from annual
US data. Other important stylized facts emphasized by the literature are the
countercyclicality of conditional volatility of stock return, the pro-cyclicality of
the price-dividend ratio and the counter-cyclicality of the conditional expected
equity premia.
5.1 The Estimated Model
We estimate the model (7)-(8)-(9) by Expectation-Maximation (EM) algorithm.
Estimated coe¢ cients are reproduced in Table (2). The switching between the
mean states is more frequent than the switching between volatility states. The
persistence of the high growth state is about 7 years, the persistence of a low
growth state is almost 5 years, while the persistence of, respectively, the high
volatility state and the low volatility state, is 41 years and 27 years. The switch-
ing between volatility regimes is a low frequency event and it has been associated
to the decline of macroeconomic risk, also termed the great moderation.
Figure (6) plots the ￿ltered state probabilities of a low volatility state along
with the probabilities of a high mean state. Consumption exhibits a considerable
reduction in volatility starting from the 90s and the ￿ltered state probabilities
approach one. The ￿gure con￿rms that the perceived switching among mean
states occurs at business cycle frequencies while the switching among volatilities
is a low frequency event.
5.2 Matching the Moments
Table (3) refers to the ambiguity neutrality case when we set ￿ = 30, such that
the model corresponds to the one calibrated in Lettau et al. (2008) which do
not consider ambiguity aversion motives. In our model this case corresponds in
setting ￿ = 30 and ￿ = 30: Figure (8) compares the observed price dividend
ratios with the one implied by the model and suggests that the calibration
considered implies quite low equilibrium prices, therefore, a sustained equity
13premium. The risk aversion parameter is, however, much higher than values
typically considered acceptable by macroeconomists (￿ less than 10 and close
to 2). Next, we consider the role of ambiguity motives (￿ > ￿). Tables (4)-
(7) collect the results from simulations for di⁄erent values of the discount factor
￿. The tables show di⁄erent interesting aspects of ambiguity motives. First,
ambiguity aversion always increases the equity return. This is due to pessimistic
distortion that ambiguity averse motives place on the investor￿ s beliefs, so that
he requires more compensation to hold a risky asset in an ambiguous economy.
Further increasing values of ambiguity aversion lower the risk free rate, helping
explaining the equity premium puzzle. On the same time our model is able to
generate very low volatility of the riskfree rate together with sustained volatility
of the equity returns.
We can also observe that when the risk aversion parameter is quite sustained
(e.g. ￿ = 30 or ￿ = 25) the e⁄ect of an increment of the degree of ambiguity
aversion are very moderate. Di⁄erent is the case when risk aversion appears
contained (e.g. ￿ = 15). In general we can observe that ambiguity aversion
allows matching the mean risk free rate and risky rates with a relatilvely low
value of the risk aversion parameter, like ￿ = 10; as it shown by the last rows
of table (7): it is suggested that a value of ambiguity aversion between 20 and
40 could match the moments.
5.3 Time Series Implications
We consider a calibration which is quite satisfactory in matching the moments
described above: ￿ = 0:9925;￿ = 15 and ￿ = 35. As in all calibrations, we set ￿
equal to 1/1.5 and ￿ = 4:5: We are interested in understanding the time series
performance of the equilibrium prices and we plot the time series of the price
dividend ratio from data with the time series implied by the model. Figure (9)
shows that the comparison is not satisfactory. As it has been already observed
in the comparative study, the switching from the high-volatility state to the low-
volatility state implies a moderation in prices which has not been observed in the
data. Extensive simulations show that low values of risk aversion associated with
high values of ambiguity aversion imply similar qualitative dynamics. As we
already noticed indeed, the e⁄ects of ambiguity aversion is much more e⁄ective in
low volatility states rather than very volatile ones. Therefore, when a very high
level of ambiguity aversion is imposed on the investor, the di⁄erent intensity
of the e⁄ect of distortion causes prices to decrease during the last part of the
sample. In ￿gure (10) we compare the observed time series of prices with the
ones implied by our model with ￿ equal to 25 and ￿; respectively, equal to 25
and 35: The ￿gure makes clear that, while ambiguity aversion is very e⁄ective
in lowering the prices explaining, therefore the high equity premium, high levels
of ambiguity aversion attenuate the e⁄ects of uncertainty on prices in unstable
times. Therefore, increased riskiness of the economy attenuates the premium
due to ambiguity aversion. This e⁄ect worsens the performance of the model
for the last part of the sample, the so called great moderation during which
prices have increased considerably. In other words, ambiguity aversion with
14the respect to mean states reinforces risk aversion, but ambiguity aversion with
the respect to volatility states does not. This tension was never emphasized
previously in the literature and we believe it constitutes an important warning
for the growing literature on ambiguity aversion and asset prices.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we consider a smooth abiguity averse representative investor in a
standard consumption based asset pricing model. We model consumption and
dividend growth rate as a regime switching process. The switching is imposed
both on the mean and on the volatility values. We estimate the Markov switch-
ing models and show that switching between volatility states is a low frequency
event: the ￿rst part of the postwar sample is characterized by high volatility,
while, starting from the 1990s we observe the so called great moderation period.
The aim of our study is to understand how ambiguity concerns interact with
beliefs about volatility and mean regimes. Our study shows that ambiguity
aversion is certainly helpful in order to explain the observed high level of equity
premia even with low values of risk aversion. Indeed, higher ambiguity aversion
lowers risk free rates while increasing the equity returns. Further, this e⁄ect
is more accentuated, the lower the level of risk aversion. Not surprisingly, in-
deed, ambiguity aversion motives have had a great success on the asset pricing
literature in recent years.
However, we also show some additional implications of ambiguity concerns
that, up to our knowledge, have not been emphasized previously. We uncover
the results summarized in the exercises aimed at matching the moments and we
analyze the time series implications of the smooth ambiguity averse preferences.
Even if succesful calibrations can match the observed moments of the equity
premia and the risk free rate, the implied time series do not appear satisfactory
for the levels of ambiguity aversion reqiuired to explain the equity premium
puzzle. This is due to the second-order distortion that ambiguity aversion places
among volatility states. Indeed, as it has already been widely documented,
the ambiguity averse investor behaves as a pessimistic agent with distorted
state probabilties among good and bad states: she removes mass probabilities
from good states in favour of bad states. However, ambiguity aversion with
respect to volatility states plays a second order e⁄ect: the pessimistic agent
considers more likely that a good new is of low quality or that a bad new is
of good quality, implying that during unstable times the distortion between
mean states is less accentuated. Therefore, high levels of ambiguity aversion
often reduce the volatility of the equity returns, due to the attenuated response
of the investor to the new observation. This e⁄ect produces counterfactual
price-dividend ratio time series. Further, the second order e⁄ect of ambiguity
aversion causes prices to decline, rathern than increase, during the last part of
the sample, characterized by a decline of volatility.
This observations constitute an important warning for the growing literature
on ambiguity aversion and asset prices and suggest the necessity to deal with
15such preferences with caution. For instance, new frameworks can be studied
which are able to emphasize the role of ambiguity aversion only in certain con-
texts where it appears to explain succesfully stylized facts (for instance during
recession times), allowing time dependence in the ambiguity aversion literature.
Another interesting analysis may consider time variation in the perception of
the ambiguity (rather than the variation in the ambiguity aversion) exploiting
the peculiar feature of the smooth ambiguity averse preferences: the separation
between ambiguity aversion (beliefs) and ambiguity (perception of ambiguity).
We leave such extensions for future research.
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A.1 Euler 1






















We conjecture a consumption rule Ct = atWt and we substitute it in (14) and


















































from which it follows that
G(￿t)



























Substituting (26) in (23), we get the following equilibrium condition for
G(￿) :
G(￿t)


































18Using (25) into (24), we get
a
￿￿
































From the budget constraint, we derive





which, substituted in (28) and after few simplications, brings to condition (15)
A.2 The pricing kernel
Substituting the expression for Rw =
PN
k=1 xkRk in (14) and taking the foc




















































































Given (15) we can simplify the ￿rst row of the above expression, which equals
a constant term, ￿
1￿￿









































































































is the distortion of the
belief of state j due to ambiguity aversion. Indeed, notice that when ￿ = ￿ we
are back to the ambiguity neutral belief. Eq. (31) shows how the ambiguity
















































































































































































eq. (18) must hold.































































































































































which corresponds to (18).
A.3 Numerical Methods


















Mj;t+1 ((1 + ’(B (￿t;y)))exp((1 ￿ ￿)￿y))f (y;j)dy
￿





and f (y;j) is the density function of a normal distribution
with mean ￿j and variance ￿j:The posterior probabilities ￿t are the only state
variables in this framework, so the price-dividend ratio is a function only of the
vector ￿t: We solve these functional equations numerically on a grid of values for
the state variables ￿t: In order to solve for the price-dividend ratio we ￿rst need





Table 1: Asset Market data: Annualized sample moments from quarterly US
data 1948:II-2005:IV, re is the return on the value-weighted NYSE portfolio
and rf is the return on the three-months Treasury bill. Returns are measured










0.926 -0.047 0.890 0.208 0.970 0.813 0.992 0.998
Table 2: Estimates for the Markov Switching model of consumption growth.
Numbers in the ￿st four columns are in percentage. Data are quarterly and
span the period between 1947:2-2009:2. Estimation by EM algorithm






























1 + ’C (B (￿t;y))
￿ 1￿￿







This which, again, is solved numerically on a grid of values for the state variables
￿t:
B Tables and Figures
std(ret) av. prem av. rf(quarterly) std(rf)
11.89 9.91 3.09 0.33
Table 3: Standard deviation of returns, average premium, average risk free
rate and standard deviation in the absence of ambiguity case. Numbers are in
percentage
23Comparative Statistics: ￿ = 0:9925
￿ rf ￿ (rf) E (rm) ￿ (rm)
Panel A: ￿ = 30
30 3:02 0:33 14:06 11:89
35 2:97 0:34 14:10 11:62
40 2:91 0:35 14:31 11:49
Panel B: ￿ = 28
28 3:14 0:33 13:29 12:07
35 3:07 0:35 13:41 11:66
40 3:01 0:35 13:70 11:57
Panel C: ￿ = 25
25 3:32 0:32 12:20 12:57
30 3:27 0:34 12:15 11:87
35 3:21 0:35 12:40 11:70
Panel D: ￿ = 20
25 3:55 0:32 10:28 13:09
30 3:49 0:33 10:33 11:62
35 3:43 0:35 10:78 11:91
Panel E: ￿ = 15
30 3:69 0:33 6:74 18:95
35 3:63 0:34 9:19 16:62
40 3:56 0:36 10:54 16:68
45 3:49 0:38 7:62 16:93
Table 4: Unconditional moments and comparative statistics. Except for the
numbers in the ￿rst column, all other numbers are in parcentage. Columns 2-5
present the mean and the standard deviation of the risk free rate and of the
equity returns. We set ￿ = 1/1.5, and ￿ = 0.9925 in all cases.
Comparative Statistics: ￿ = 0:986
￿ rf ￿ (rf) E (rm) ￿ (rm)
Panel A: ￿ = 30
30 5:72 0:34 15:65 11:49
35 5:65 0:35 16:01 11:40
40 5:58 0:36 16:39 11:35
Table 5: Unconditional moments and comparative statistics. Except for the
numbers in the ￿rst column, all other numbers are in parcentage. Columns 2-5
present the mean and the standard deviation of the risk free rate and of the
equity returns. We set ￿ = 1/1.5, and ￿ = 0.986 in all cases.
24Comparative Statistics: ￿ = 0:994
￿ rf ￿ (rf) E (rm) ￿ (rm)
Panel A: ￿ = 30
30 2:40 0:32 14:08 12:05
35 2:37 0:34 13:85 11:70
Panel A: ￿ = 25
25 2:72 0:32 12:34 13:17
30 2:68 0:33 11:84 12:01
35 2:64 0:35 11:97 11:74
Panel B: ￿ = 20
20 3:00 0:31 9:35 59:01
25 2:96 0:32 9:47 22:37
30 2:92 0:33 9:83 11:66
Panel B: ￿ = 15
15 3:12 0:33 4:56 22:70
35 3:07 0:35 6:64 25:28
Panel B: ￿ = 10
25 3:34 0:30 4:54 22:74
30 3:29 0:32 3:42 27:55
40 3:23 0:34 3:09 33:15
Table 6: Unconditional moments and comparative statistics. Except for the
numbers in the ￿rst column, all other numbers are in parcentage. Columns 2-5
present the mean and the standard deviation of the risk free rate and of the
equity returns. We set ￿ = 1/1.5, and ￿ = 0.994 in all cases.
25Comparative Statistics: ￿ = 0:996
￿ rf ￿ (rf) E (rm) ￿ (rm)
Panel A: ￿ = 25
25 1:81 0:31 14:63 15:50
30 1:81 0:32 11:83 12:38
35 1:80 0:34 11:41 11:81
Panel A: ￿ = 20
20 2:14 0:30 ￿0:4 59:17
25 2:12 0:32 4:98 42:04
30 2:10 0:33 9:14 11:70
Panel B: ￿ = 15
15 2:42 0:28 ￿0:02 50:68
20 2:39 0:30 6:95 28:98
25 2:36 0:31 6:96 16:16
30 2:31 0:33 4:74 25:53
Panel B: ￿ = 10
10 2:64 0:26 2:45 38:52
20 2:57 0:29 6:53 18:25
40 2:21 0:42 9:75 55:70
Table 7: Unconditional moments and comparative statistics. Except for the
numbers in the ￿rst column, all other numbers are in parcentage. Columns 2-5
present the mean and the standard deviation of the risk free rate and of the
equity returns. We set ￿ = 1/1.5, and ￿ = 0.996 in all cases.












time serie of rate of growth of PCE, log(C t+1/Ct)
Figure 1: Time serie of the rate of growth of Total Personal Consumption
Expenditure. Data are quarterly and span the period 1947:2-2009:2. Source:
BEA.
































































































































































Figure 4: Conditional equity premium plotted as a function of the probability of high
growth state. The left panel conditiones on high volatility state and the right panel























































Figure 5: Conditional equity premium plotted as a function of the probability of low
volatility state. The left panel conditiones on high mean state and the right panel on
low mean state (￿ = 25;￿ = 1=1:5;￿ = 4:5;￿ = 0:9925).














Figure 6: The ￿gure plots the time series of estimated state probabilities.
P(low variance) is the unconditional probability of being in a low consumption
volatility state next period (solid line), calculated by summing the probability
of being in a low volatility and high mean state and the probability of a low
volatility and low mean state. P(high mean) is calculated analogously. The
data are quarterly and span the period 1947:2-2009:2.














Figure 7: Source: Lettau et al., RFS (2008) The ￿gure plots the time series of
estimated state probabilities. P(low variance) is the unconditional probability
of being in a low consumption volatility state next period (solid line), calculated
by summing the probability of being in a low volatility and high mean state
and the probability of a low volatility and low mean state. P(high mean) is
calculated analogously. The data are quarterly and span the period 1952:1-
2002:4.

















Figure 8: Price-dividend ratio (ambiguity neutrality).













Figure 9: Time Series of the Price-Dividend ratio. Time series of the log price-
dividend ratio from the data and implied by the model. The risk aversion
parameter and the ambiguity aversion parameters are set, respectively to ￿ =
15 and ￿ - ￿ = 20. The rate of time preferences ￿ = 0.9925 and the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution 1/￿= 1.5 and leverage ￿ = 4.5. The data are
quarterly and span the period 1952:1-2002:4.


















Figure 10: Time series of the log price-dividend ratio from the data and implied
by the model for di⁄erent ambiguity aversion values. In both simluations we set
￿ = 25;￿ = 1=1:5;￿ = 0:9925 and ￿ = 4:5:














Figure 11: Price-dividend ratio. Ambiguity loving (￿ = 30;￿ = 15)
33